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Abstract
Data envelopment analysis very often identiﬁes more than one candidate in a voting system to be DEA efﬁcient. In order to
choose a winner from among the DEA efﬁcient candidates, this paper proposes a new method that discriminates the DEA efﬁcient
candidates by considering their least relative total scores. The proposed method is illustrated with two numerical examples and
proves to be effective and practical.
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1. Introduction
In voting systems, one candidate may receive different votes in different ranking places. The total score of each
candidate is the weighted sum of the votes he/she receives in different places. The winner is the one with the biggest
total score. So, the key issue is how to determine the weights associated with different places.
Cook and Kress [1] suggest using data envelopment analysis (DEA) to determine the most favorable weights for
each candidate. Different candidates utilize different sets of weights to calculate their total scores, which are referred
to as the best relative total scores and are all restricted to be less than or equal to one. The candidate with the biggest
relative total score of unity is said to be DEA efﬁcient and may be considered as a winner. This approach proves to be
effective, but very often leads to more than one candidate to be DEA efﬁcient.
In order to choose a real winner from among the DEA efﬁcient candidates, Cook and Kress suggest maximizing the
gap between the weights so that only one candidate is left DEA efﬁcient. This has been found equivalent to imposing
a common set of weights on all candidates and therefore Green et al. [4] propose the use of the cross-efﬁciency evalu-
ation technique in DEA to choose the winner. Noguchi et al. [6] also utilize the cross-efﬁciency evaluation technique
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to select the winner, but present a strong ordering constraint condition on weights. Hashimoto [5] brings forward the
use of DEA exclusion model (i.e., super-efﬁciency model) to identify the winner. Obata and Ishii [7] suggest excluding
non-DEA efﬁcient candidates and using normalizedweights to discriminate the DEA efﬁcient candidates. Their method
is subsequently extended to rank non-DEA efﬁcient candidates in [3] (see also [2]).
In this paper, we propose an alternative method to discriminate the DEA efﬁcient candidates. Since the DEA
efﬁcient candidates cannot be discriminated by their best relative total scores, the proposed method considers further
their least relative total scores. The winner should be the DEA efﬁcient candidate with the biggest least relative total
score.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we develop the models for measuring the best and the
least relative total scores of each candidate. Section 3 examines two numerical examples using the proposed method
to illustrate its applications. The paper is concluded in Section 4.
2. The Models
2.1. DEA models for measuring the best relative total scores
It is assumed that in a voting system, each voter selects m candidates from n candidates (nm) and ranks them from
top to the mth place, each place associated with a relative importance weight wj (j = 1, . . . , m). Let vij be the votes
of the candidate i being ranked in the j th place. The total score of each candidate is deﬁned as
Zi =
m∑
j=1
vijwj , i = 1, . . . , n, (1)
which is a linear function of the relative importance weights. Once the weights are given or determined, candidates
can be ranked in terms of their total scores. To avoid subjectivity in determining the relative importance weights,
Cook and Kress [1] suggest the following DEA model which determines the most favourable weights for each
candidate:
Maximize Zi =
m∑
j=1
vijwj
s.t.
m∑
j=1
vijwj 1, i = 1, . . . , n,
wj − wj+1d(j, ), j = 1, . . . , m − 1,
wmd(m, ),
(2)
where d(., ) is referred to as a discrimination intensity function that is non-negative and monotonically increasing in
a non-negative  and satisﬁes d(., 0) = 0. It is found that the choice of the functional form of d(., ) and the value of 
has signiﬁcant impacts on the winner. For example, Cook and Kress [1] investigate three cases for the functional form
of d(., ) : d(j, ) = , d(j, ) = /j and d(j, ) = /j !, each of them leading to a different winner. Noguchi et al. [6]
examine six cases for the value of  :  = 0, 0.01, 0.05, 0.055, 0.06 and 0.07, respectively. These cases also result in
different winners. To avoid the difﬁculties in choice of the functional form of d(., ) and the value of , Noguchi et al.
[6] develop a strong ordering DEA model, which is shown below:
Maximize Zi =
m∑
j=1
vijwj
s.t.
m∑
j=1
vijwj 1, i = 1, . . . , n,
w12w2 · · · mwm,
wm = 2
Nm(m + 1) ,
(3)
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where N is the number of voters. This model will be used in this paper to evaluate the best relative total score of each
candidate. However, it is found that  can take values within the interval [0, ], where
 = min
i
{
1/m∑m
j=1(vij /j)
}
>
1/m
max
i
{∑m
j=1(vij )
} > 1
Nm
, (4)
and  = 2/Nm(m + 1) is only one possible choice. This is because wj w1/j and ∑mj=1vijwj ∑mj=1vij (w1/j).
When w1
∑m
j=1(vij /j)1 holds for any i = 1, . . . , n, namely, w1mini{1/(
∑m
j=1(vij /j))}, all the constraints of
model (3) are satisﬁed. From wmw1/m, it can be derived that mini{1/m/(∑mj=1(vij /j))}. In Section 3 we
will set several more cases for  for test. If a candidate is identiﬁed to have the best relative total score of one, then
he/she is said to be DEA efﬁcient; otherwise he/she is non-DEA efﬁcient.
2.2. DEA model for measuring the least relative total scores
Models (2) and (3) very often identify more than one candidate to be DEA efﬁcient. These DEA efﬁcient candidates
cannot be discriminated by their best relative total scores. Now that they cannot be differentiated by their best relative
total scores, we may consider further their least relative total scores. The least relative total score is contrary to the best
relative total score and represents the score each candidate receives in the most unfavorable situation. Theoretically, the
best and the worst relative total scores should be measured within the same range and should constitute an interval for
each candidate. For example, they can be measured within the range of [, 1], where > 0 is a predeﬁned parameter.
The corresponding model can be constructed as follows:
Minimize/Maximize
m∑
j=1
vijwj
s.t. 
m∑
j=1
vijwj 1, i = 1, . . . , n,
w12w2 · · · mwm,
wm.
(5)
However, if the least relative total score is measured in this way, the biggest difﬁculty is the need to predeﬁne an
appropriate value for . This is obviously not easy and also too subjective. To avoid the difﬁculty and any sub-
jectivity in predeﬁning the value of , we deﬁne the least relative total score of each candidate by the following
model:
Minimize Yi =
m∑
j=1
vijwj
s.t.
m∑
j=1
vijwj 1, i = 1, . . . , n,
w12w2 · · · mwm,
wm.
(6)
This model can be solved for all the candidates to be considered. Our purpose, however, is to choose the winner from
among those DEA efﬁcient candidates. So, we solve the model only for DEA efﬁcient candidates. Let Y ∗i be the least
relative total score obtained by model (6). Then Y ∗i and Z∗i form an interval of score for the ith candidate as long
as the value of  is small enough, where Z∗i is the best relative total score obtained by model (3). According to the
comparison rule of interval numbers, if two positive interval numbers have the same upper bound, then the one with
bigger lower bound is more preferred to the other one. This is the reason why we compare the least relative total scores
of DEA efﬁcient candidates to determine the winner, who should be the DEA efﬁcient candidate with the greatest least
relative total score.
Model (6) differs from models (2) and (3) in several aspects. Firstly, model (6) compares DEA efﬁcient candidates
by their least (worst) rather than best relative total scores. Next, model (6) identiﬁes DEA inefﬁcient candidates, but
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cannot identify DEA efﬁcient candidates. Thirdly, model (6) measures the least relative total scores with the range of
greater than or equal to one, while models (2) and (3) measure the best relative total scores within the range of less
than or equal to one. Finally, models (2) and (3) determine an efﬁciency frontier (i.e. score frontier) for the candidates
to be considered, while model (6) deﬁnes an inefﬁciency frontier for them.
If a candidate is identiﬁed by model (6) to have the least relative total score of one, then he/she is said to be
DEA inefﬁcient; otherwise he/she is said to be non-DEA inefﬁcient. Traditionally, DEA models distinguish decision
making units (DMUs) or candidates as DEA efﬁcient or not. The latter is usually referred to as non-DEA efﬁcient.
It must be made clear that non-DEA efﬁcient and DEA inefﬁcient are two different concepts and should not be used
interchangeably. The non-DEA efﬁcient DMUs or candidates are deﬁned from the optimistic point of view and mean
that their best relative efﬁciencies or scores are less than one, i.e. they do not lie in the efﬁciency frontier, while the
DEA inefﬁcient DMUs or candidates are deﬁned from the pessimistic point of view and represent that they lie in the
inefﬁciency frontier and have the least relative efﬁciencies or scores of one. The relationship between them is as follows:
non-DEA efﬁcient DMUs or candidates may be DEA inefﬁcient and the DEA inefﬁcient DMUs or candidates can also
be non-DEA efﬁcient. As such, DEA efﬁcient and non-DEA inefﬁcient are also two different concepts and should not
be confused or used interchangeably. In summary, DMUs or candidates can be classiﬁed as three categories: DEA
efﬁcient, DEA inefﬁcient, DEA unspeciﬁed which means they are neither DEA efﬁcient nor DEA inefﬁcient, where
DEA efﬁcient and DEA inefﬁcient units or candidates may have some overlap, i.e. common DMUs or candidates.
With regard to model (6) we have the theorem below.
Theorem 1. Epsilon has no impact on the solution of model (6) if
 max
i
{
1/m∑m
j=1(vij /j)
}
. (7)
Proof. Fromw12w2 · · ·mwm, it is known thatwj mwm/j , j=1, . . ., m−1.Accordingly,wehave∑mj=1vijwj ∑m
j=1vij (mwm/j) = mwm
∑m
j=1(vij /j). Let mwm
∑m
j=1(vij /j)1 for i = 1, . . . , n. It follows that wmmaxi
{1/m/(∑mj=1(vij /j))}. That is to say, there is an inﬁmum for wm. Therefore, when maxi{1/m/(∑mj=1(vij /j))},
the constraint condition wm will be redundant in the model. So, model (6) will not be affected by its value when
(7) holds for . 
This theorem clearly shows that epsilon can in fact be removed from model (6) because the purpose of imposing
such a constraint wm in both models (3) and (6) is to avoid wm taking value of zero. This feature can be seen as an
advantage of model (6) because it does not need to specify subjective parameters.
Since models (2) and (3) determine an efﬁciency frontier, which envelops all those non-DEA efﬁcient DMUs or
candidates, while model (6) determines an inefﬁciency frontier, which lies below all those non-DEA inefﬁcient DMUs
or candidates, the two different frontiers cannot be superpositioned unless all the DMUs or candidates are both DEA
efﬁcient and inefﬁcient which is very rare or seldom happens in real voting systems. Therefore, the winner can always
be determined when model (6) is considered together with models (2) or (3) except for that extreme case.We will show
this point with two numerical examples in Section 3.
3. Numerical examples
In this section we examine two numerical examples using the proposed method to illustrate its applications and show
its capability in discriminating DEA efﬁcient candidates.
Example 1. Consider the example investigated by Cook and Kress [1], in which 20 voters are asked to rank 4 out of
6 candidates A ∼ F on a ballot. The votes each candidate receives are shown in Table 1.
In this example, n = 6, m = 4 and N = 20. By Eq. (4),  can take any values within the interval [0, 0.027]. We test
three cases for the value of  :  = 0.005, 0.01 and 0.0167, which correspond to 2/Nm(m + 1), 4/Nm(m + 1) and
2/N1m(m+ 1), respectively, where N1 = 6 is the biggest vote each candidate receives in different places. These values
are set purely arbitrarily without any speciﬁc implications. The purpose of choosing these values is just to show the
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Table 1
Votes received by six candidates
Candidate First place Second place Third place Fourth place
A 3 3 4 3
B 4 5 5 2
C 6 2 3 2
D 6 2 2 6
E 0 4 3 4
F 1 4 3 3
Table 2
DEA assessment for the six candidates
Candidate  = 0.005  = 0.01  = 0.0167
The best The least The best The least The best The least
score (Zi) score (Yi) score (Zi) score (Yi) score (Zi) score (Yi)
A 0.7376 — 0.7376 — 0.7348 —
B 1 2.1667 1 2.1667 0.9920 —
C 1 2.1250 0.9985 — 0.9725 —
D 1 2.2917 1 2.2917 1 2.2917
E 0.4364 — 0.4364 — 0.4364 —
F 0.5198 — 0.5198 — 0.5196 —
Note: The symbol “—” means there is no need to calculate the least relative total scores for non-DEA efﬁcient candidates.
Table 3
Votes received by seven candidates
Candidate First rank Second rank
A 32 10
B 28 20
C 13 36
D 20 27
E 27 19
F 30 8
G 0 30
fact that the choice of the value of  has inﬂuence on the number of DEA efﬁcient candidates to be identiﬁed which
was not mentioned in Ref. [6].
Table 2 shows the best relative total scores of the six candidates and the least relative total score of each DEA efﬁcient
candidate obtained by solving models (3) and (6) under the three different values of , respectively.As can be seen from
Table 2, when  = 0.005, DEA model (3) identiﬁes candidates B, C and D as DEA efﬁcient, but cannot discriminate
them further. DEA model (6), however, can distinguish them very easily. According to the least relative total scores of
the three candidates, D is obviously the winner because he/she has the largest least relative total score. It is also clear
from Table 2 that the number of DEA efﬁcient candidates decreases as  increases, but  has no impact on the least
relative total scores of each DEA efﬁcient candidates, which has been conﬁrmed by Theorem 1. As a matter of fact, by
Inequality (7), it can be computed that maxi{1/m/(∑mj=1(vij /j))} = 0.0625, which means when 0.0625, the least
relative total score of each DEA efﬁcient candidates will not be affected by its value. Therefore, no matter what value
 takes, D is always the winner. Such a conclusion is consistent with Cook and Kress’s recommendation by setting
d(j, ) = /j and maximizing  and also consistent with Green et al.’s cross efﬁciency assessment result [4].
Example 2. Consider the example investigated in [7,3], where 7 candidates A ∼ G are ranked. Table 3 shows the
votes each candidate receives in the ﬁrst two places.
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Table 4
DEA assessment for the seven candidates
Candidate  = 0.003  = 0.006  = 0.009
The best The least The best The least The best The least
score (Zi) score (Yi) score (Zi) score (Yi) score (Zi) score (Yi)
A 1 2.4667 1 2.4667 1 2.4667
B 1 2.5333 1 2.5333 1 2.5333
C 0.8158 — 0.8158 — 0.8158 —
D 0.8816 — 0.8816 — 0.8816 —
E 0.9611 — 0.9611 — 0.9611 —
F 0.9334 — 0.9292 — 0.9251 —
G 0.3947 — 0.3947 — 0.3947 —
Table 5
Cross efﬁciency assessment of the seven candidates
Candidate Cross efﬁciency (i.e. cross score) Overall score Ranking
A B C D E F G
A 1 0.9737 0.9737 0.9737 1 1 0.9737 0.9850 2
B 1 1 1 1 1 0.9087 1 0.9870 1
C 0.7611 0.8158 0.8158 0.8158 0.7611 0.5021 0.8158 0.7554 6
D 0.8556 0.8816 0.8816 0.8816 0.8556 0.6872 0.8816 0.8464 5
E 0.9611 0.9605 0.9605 0.9605 0.9611 0.8754 0.9605 0.9485 3
F 0.9222 0.8947 0.8947 0.8947 0.9222 0.9334 0.8947 0.9081 4
G 0.3333 0.3947 0.3947 0.3947 0.3333 0.09 0.3947 0.3336 7
For this example, n = 7 and m = 2, but the exact number of voters is unknown. By Eq. (4), it can be computed that
=0.013, i.e.  can take values within the interval [0, 0.013].We also test three cases for it: =0.003, 0.006 and 0.009.
These values are also set arbitrarily and are not speciﬁcally conﬁgured.
Table 4 shows the best relative total scores of the seven candidates and the least relative total scores of the two
identiﬁed DEA efﬁcient candidates. The results are obtained by solving models (3) and (6) under the three different
values of , respectively. By Inequality (7), it is computed that maxi{1/m/(∑mj=1(vij /j))} = 0.033. Since  = 0.003,
0.006 and 0.009 are all less than 0.033, these three values of  have no effect on the least relative total scores of DEA
efﬁcient candidates. For this speciﬁc example, it is also observed that  has little impact on the best relative total scores of
the seven candidates. Both candidatesA and B are identiﬁed as DEA efﬁcient, but their least relative total scores clearly
show that candidate B is the winner. Such a conclusion is entirely consistent with Obata and Ishii’s recommendation
[7] and Foroughi and Tamiz’s result [3] by selecting the maximum acceptable value of  (that is 1/76) or selecting a
large value for  (for example  = 100). Foroughi and Tamiz also got another recommendation, i.e. candidate A is
the winner, by selecting different values for  and . In comparison with their method which produces two different
winners depending on the selection of parameters, our method yields only one winner no matter what values  takes.
This is obviously a good feature of our proposed method.
It is argued that the cross efﬁciency [4] can be well explained with a sound physical meaning and should be used as
a benchmark in the examples to have been examined. To conﬁrm further that candidate B is the real winner, we present
the cross efﬁciency assessment matrix of the seven candidates under the value of  = 0.003 and their overall scores
that are the arithmetic averages of the cross efﬁciencies/scores of each candidate in Table 5, from which it can be seen
very clearly that B is indeed the winner. Due to the fact that the values of  only affect the best relative total score of F
very slightly, such a small inﬂuence does not change the fact that B is the winner. So, the cross efﬁciency assessment
matrices for the seven candidates under  = 0.006 and 0.009 are therefore omitted to save space.
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4. Conclusions
How to choose a winner from among DEA efﬁcient candidates is an issue that has been studied, but needs further
investigation. In this paper we have proposed a newmethod to select a winner. The proposed method considers both the
best and the least relative total scores of each DEA efﬁcient candidate and chooses the DEA efﬁcient candidate with
the largest least relative total score as the winner. Two numerical examples have been examined using the proposed
method. It has been shown that the proposed method can effectively discriminate DEA efﬁcient candidates and choose
the winner. The proposed method can also be extended to differentiate DEA efﬁcient DMUs in efﬁciency assessment.
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